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Abstract
Classifying political regimes has never been as di cult as in this day and age. Most regimes
in the world now hold de-jure multiparty elections with universal su↵rage. Yet, in some
countries these elections ensure that political rulers are   at least somewhat   accountable
to the electorate whereas in others they are a mere window dressing exercise for authoritarian
politics. Hence, regime types need to be distinguished based on the de-facto implementation
of democratic rules. To this end, researchers increasingly turn to expert-coded data sets such
as the new Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset. Using V-Dem data, we propose an
operationalization of four important regime types closed and electoral autocracies; electoral
and liberal democracies with vast coverage (almost all countries form 1900 to 2016) and
precision. Our new Regimes in the World (RIW) measure includes uncertainty estimates
to identify countries in the grey zone between regime types and account for inter-coder
disagreement. In cases of disagreement with other datasets (7-12% of the cases), we classify
regimes with severe electoral manipulation and infringements of the political freedoms more
frequently as electoral autocracies than other datasets, which suggests that our measure
captures the opaqueness of contemporary autocracies better.
Introduction
Classifying political regimes has never been as di cult as in this day and age. Most regimes
in the world hold de-jure multiparty elections with universal su↵rage. Yet, in some countries
these elections ensure that political rulers are at least somewhat accountable to the elec-
torate whereas in others they are a mere window dressing exercise for authoritarian politics.
Therefore we need experts to help us assess the de-facto characteristics of political
regimes. Such expert-coded data is provided by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project
covering 177 countries from 1900 to 2016 (Coppedge et al., 2017c; Coppedge et al., 2017a).
V-Dem is the first systematic e↵ort to measure the de-facto existence of all institutions in
Robert Dahl’s famous articulation of “Polyarchy” as electoral democracy (Coppedge et al.,
2016; Dahl, 1971; Dahl, 1998). Liberal democracy is then conceptualized as the existence of
electoral democracy in combination with three additional components: rule of law ensuring
respect for civil liberties, and constraints on the executive by the judiciary, as well as by the
legislature (Lindberg et al., 2014; Coppedge et al., 2017d).
In the V-Dem data set, the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) and Liberal Component
Index (LCI) reflect these principles, but only on a continuous scale (Coppedge et al., 2017c).
Lindberg (2016) proposes ordinalized version of these indices but without developing and
validating a consistent regime typology. However, much scholarly work relies on a relatively
clear identification of regime types. For instance, Lu¨hrmann, McMann, and Van Ham (2017)
study in which regime types democracy aid is e↵ective. Likewise, studies on democratic dif-
fusion (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006), backsliding (Erdmann, 2011), sequencing (Wang et al.,
2017) and characteristics of authoritarian regimes (Schedler, 2013), use regime categories.
In particular, a clear threshold between democracy and autocracy is important for studies
on regime survival (Bernhard et al., 2015; Svolik, 2008; Przeworski et al., 2000). A num-
ber of important questions on democratization, e↵ects of institutions, and trajectories over
time, benefit from a distinct regime typology spanning from the worst autocracies to the
best democracies. It should naturally be theoretically justified, coherent and consistent, and
meet empirical validity tests. That is what we aim to provide here.
We use the V-Dem data to classify countries in four regime categories. In closed au-
tocracies, the chief executive is either not subjected to elections or there is no meaningful,
de-facto competition in elections. Electoral autocracies hold de-facto multiparty elections
for the chief executive, but they fall short of democratic standards due to significant irregu-
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larities, limitations on party competition or other violations of Dahl’s institutional requisites
for democracies. To be counted as electoral democracies, countries not only have to hold
de-facto free and fair and multiparty elections, but also based on Dahl achieve a high level
of institutional guarantees for democracies such as freedom of association, su↵rage, clean
elections, an elected executive, and freedom of expression. In addition to these principles,
e↵ective legislative and judicial oversight of the executive, protection of individual liberties
and the rule of law denominate as liberal democracies.
Besides taking advantage of the latest and most comprehensive on democracy providing
unique variables of de-facto institutional guarantees, a key innovation of our regime typology
is that we also develop a method to let V-Dem’s estimates of uncertainty inform the regime
type measures. This provides two distinct advantages. First, it allows us to distinguish cases
that are most certainly in a particular regime category from others who are closer to falling
out of it, or taking a step upwards, and making it possible to integrate this more fine-tuned
information in analyses. Second, it makes it possible for the first time to estimate trends
of how countries are placed in definite versus ambiguous regime types, something which is
more important now than ever given the sharp rise of de-jure democratic institutions in
non-democratic states. Finally, we provide a much vaster coverage than most extant regime
typologies, with data for the current decade and reaching back to 1900.
In Part 1 of this paper we discuss prior approaches to drawing the line between regime
types. Part 2 introduces our regime typology and Part 3 compares our regime typology to
several of the most frequently used extant measures.
1 Prior Approaches to Drawing the Line between Regime
Types
There is a longstanding academic discussion on the conceptual and methodological advan-
tages of di↵erent measures of political regimes. One contentious issue is if democracy is a
best understood as a multidimensional (Coppedge et al., 2011; Dahl, 1971; Vanhanen, 2005),
continuous (Bollen and Jackman, 1989; Lindberg, 2006), polychotomous (Collier and Levit-
sky, 1997), or a dichotomous concept (Alvarez et al., 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland,
2010). A related debate focuses on the di↵erentiation between democratic and various types
of autocratic regimes (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, 2013; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz,
2014; Kailitz, 2013), sometimes including a grey zone (Diamond, 2002). These debates will
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likely never be settled. From a philosophical perspective, we agree with Collier and Adcock
(1999) that the appropriate type of regime measure depends on the nature of the research
question at hand. We seek here to provide a robust and comprehensive regime type measure
with associated estimates of uncertainty, for research requiring an ordinal or dichotomous
measure.
The first step in any regime typology is drawing a line between democracies and autoc-
racies. Extant dichotomous measures of democracy and autocracy are abound but su↵er
from weaknesses of methodological or validity character (cf. Alvarez et al. (1996), Cheibub,
Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), Golder (2005), Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013), and Ulfelder
and Lustik (2007). Other e↵orts focus on capturing various autocratic regime types (Ged-
des et al. 2014, Wahman et al, 2013, Kailitz 2013, Magloni et al. 2013) failing to capture
the entire regime spectrum from autocracy to democracy, but delineating autocracies from
democracies.
In the literature there are two main approaches to conceptualizing and crafting dichoto-
mous measures of democracy and autocracy: as a di↵erence in kind or degree associated with
a qualitative and a quantitative approach to measurement, respectively (Lindberg 2006, 22-
27). The in kind/qualitative approach typically proceeds in a Sartorian fashion by setting a
number of necessary conditions that a regime must fulfill in order to be coded as a democracy
(1970). For example, that there are competitive, multiparty elections with su↵rage extended
to a certain share of the population. The degree/quantitative strand usually introduces a
cut o↵ on a continuous measure of democracy, coding countries above the threshold as demo-
cratic and countries as autocratic. In the following, we go into detail on how six of the most
influential datasets on regimes distinguish between democracies and autocracies.
Drawing Line: In-kind/Qualitative Approaches
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010; hereafter CGV) apply three criteria a regime must
have in order to be coded as democratic: uncertainty, irreversibility and repeatability.1 To
fulfill these a country must have a legislature elected in popular elections and a chief execu-
tive that is either directly, or indirectly elected. Furthermore, there must be more than one
legal party. Finally, they employ the controversial alternation rule: an alternation of power
must have occurred under the same electoral rules that brought the incumbent into o ce.
While these clear and parsimonious coding rules minimize the need for subjective judgments,
1Their “Democracy and Dictatorship-” dataset builds on earlier work by an overlapping group of authors
(Cheibub et al. 1996; Przeworski et al. 2000).
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they also come at a cost. The latter two of these criteria raises concerns of conceptual valid-
ity. The mere existence of two legal parties hardly guarantees contestation, as understood in
established democratic theory (Dahl, 1971), and the rule leads to errors of two kinds. First,
as Wahman (2014) shows, the alternation rule can underestimate the number of democra-
cies since incumbents often enjoy an electoral advantage even in established democracies.
Democracies that change electoral rules will be less likely to see an alternation of power
under the same set of rules no matter how democratic they are. Second, even manipulated
and un-democratic elections may be lost, which leads to the alternation rule overestimating
the number of autocracies (Wahman 2014: 222). These biases of the alternation rule have
consequences for empirical research. For example, Knutsen and Wig (2015) show that the
alternation rule leads to underestimating democracy’s e↵ect on economic growth.
Geddes, Wright and Franz (2014; hereafter GWF) first sort all cases into either the demo-
cratic or autocratic bin, before proceeding to classify sub-categories of the latter. In doing
so, GWF employ the following qualitative coding rules: a case is coded as democratic if the
executive achieves power through “reasonably fair competitive” direct or indirect elections
with su↵rage exceeding to at least 10 percent of the population (Geddes et al. 2012: 6). This
requires a fair amount of judgment on the coders’ side. For example, relying on reports from
election observers to determine if an election was reasonably “fair and competitive” can be
problematic as such organizations lack shared standards (Kelley, 2009). It is not clear what
a “competitive” election or “large” party is by GWF’s standards, nor how GWF estimate
the size of parties that did not enjoy legal rights (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, 2013).
Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012; hereafter BMR) provide the dichotomous measure of
democracy with the broadest historical scope, coding from 1800 to 2007. Similar to CGV
and GWF, BMR rely on a set of necessary conditions. For a country to be coded as demo-
cratic, the executive must either be directly or indirectly elected in “popular” elections and
the legislature in “free and fair” elections. They also require that a majority of the male
population has the right to vote. BMR face a similar weakness as GWF they asses the
freedom and fairness of elections without being minimizing bias due to coder potentially
erroneous judgment.
Drawing Line: Degree/Quantitative Approaches
Other scholars apply a threshold on a continuous measure to distinguish between political
regimes (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, 2013; Lindberg, 2016; Schedler, 2013; Hadenius
and Teorell, 2007). The most apparent di culty with this approach is deciding where to
4
draw the line between democracies and autocracies, which is inevitably, an arbitrary decision
(Bogaards, 2012). Even for the most commonly used large-N data sets Freedom House and
Polity there is no consensus in the literature on where to draw the line. Bogaards (2012)
identifies at least 14 di↵erent ways to use Freedom House ratings and at least 18 di↵erent
ways to use the Polity scores to classify democracies.
Freedom House itself uses its political rights and civil liberty scores to label countries
as “free”, “partly free” and “not free” (Freedom House, 2017). However, this three-level
ordinal scale evades the question of which “partly free” country is a democracy and which
not. Furthermore, it neglects any necessary conditions such as free and fair elections that
are commonly found in the literature. Similarly, the Polity project (Marshall, Gurr, and
Jaggers, 2014) provides various detailed assessments of di↵erent aspects of regime quality,
but refrain from identifying an unambiguous cut-o↵ point between democracy and autocracy.
Polity suggests using the combined Polity score to cut the regime spectrum in three parts:
autocracies (-10 to -6), democracies (6 to 10) and anocracies in-between the two categories.2
Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013, hereafter WTH) identify the cut-o↵ point on a
combined Freedom House and Polity scale that best represents five qualitative democracy
measures, such as the ones we discussed above.3 They proceed by estimating the mean score
on the combined scale for the year before democratic breakdown and the year after transition
as coded by the five measures. They then use the grand mean of seven of these years as their
empirical cuto↵ point for democracy, while advising users to run robustness checks using the
both the 6.5 and 7.5 levels respectively.
Moving Beyond the State of the Art
In sum, both quantitative and qualitative approaches have their respective strengths and
weaknesses. The strength of qualitative approaches is that they rely on a clearly defined
set of necessary and su cient criteria, which makes it easier to identify why countries are
scored as democracies or not. On the other hand, these criteria tend to be quite narrow
and election-focused and neglect key prerequisites for democratic processes such as freedom
of association and speech (see Dahl 1971). The continuous measures that form the baseline
for the quantitative approaches tend to reflect a broader notion of democracy - in particular
2See: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html (accessed: 17 May 2017). The standardized
authority codes (-66, -77 and -88) used to indicate non-consolidated polities should also be placed in the
anocratic spectrum.
3This scale ranges from 0 to 10 and aims at compensating for each measures respective weaknesses
(Hadenius and Teorell, 2005).
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Freedom House. However, by applying a simple cut-o↵ point on a (quasi) continuous scale,
it remains ambiguous, what exact characteristics countries have that are qualified as democ-
racies. With the exception of CGV, all the above rely relatively heavily on the judgment
of coders, without being fully transparent about the rules and procedures applied in this
process. This risks reducing both reliability and validity of the measures (Coppedge et al.,
2017b).
With the regime typology proposed in this paper we aim at combining the strengths of
both methodologies: We use necessary criteria to mark the qualitative di↵erence between
the democratic and autocratic regime spectrum and an additional cut-o↵ point on V-Dem’s
relatively thick Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) in order not to operationalize democracy
too narrowly. Furthermore, the V-Dem methodology avoids some of the shortcomings of
earlier expert-coded data sets by using five coders per data point and a Bayesian IRT model
to minimize coder bias (Coppedge et al., 2017d).
2 Introducing the Regimes In the World (RIW) Ty-
pology
After this (admittedly brief) review of some of the main extant regime typologies, we en-
deavor to classify regime in four categories: closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral
democracy and liberal democracy (Table 1). First, we separate between the democratic
and the autocratic regime spectrum and then develop the democratic and autocratic sub-
types.4 In democracies, rulers are accountable to citizens through periodic elections and in
autocracies they are not.5 To be counted as democracies, regimes therefore have to fulfill
three criteria: (1) hold free and fair and (2) de-facto multiparty elections, and (3) achieve
at least a minimal level of institutional guarantees such as freedom of association, su↵rage,
clean elections, an elected executive, and freedom of expression following Dahl’s (1971, 1998)
widely accepted theory of polyarchy.
This notion of democracy goes beyond minimalist (Schumpeterian) definitions of democ-
racy since it considers not only the electoral event but also to what extent the political
4This strategy follows common advice for concept formation (e.g. Collier and Adcock (1999), Sartori
(1970), and Goertz (2006).
5This definition reflects the electoral principle of democracy (Coppedge et al., 2016, : 583). Many would
agree with Pastor (1999, : 123) that ‘[t]he essence of democratic government is accountability.”
6
Table 1: Regime Classification
Closed Autocracy Electoral Autocracy Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy
No free and fair, de-facto multiparty elections or Free and fair and multiparty elections and
minimal institutional prerequisites not fulfilled minimal institutional prerequisites fulfilled
No multiparty elections Elections for the chief Liberal principles not Liberal principles
for the chief executive executive with a minimal satisfied satisfied
level of multiparty
competition
environment enables meaningful competition. It is thus closer to Dahl’s (1971, 1989) un-
derstanding of democracy as ’polyarchy’. At the same time, our definition does not reflect
more demanding notions of democracy requiring, for instance, respect for minority rights
(Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, 1787), a certain quality of public deliberation (Habermas,
1996), or a degree of consolidation of democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1996).
Among democracies, we distinguish between electoral democracies that only achieve the
three fundamental criteria for democracy outlined above, and liberal democracies. We chose
to focus on the electoral/liberal divide, because this is the most common distinction within
the democratic regime spectrum (Merkel, 2004; Munck, 2009; Diamond, 1999; Diamond,
2002). Liberal democracies also protect individual rights and place constraints on the ex-
ecutive arm of government. Such in Dahl’s words   “Madisonian” democracies strike a
balance between the principle of rule by the people and the protection of minorities (Dahl,
1956, : 4)). Key checks and balances are e↵ective by legislative and judicial oversight over
the executive, protection of individual liberties, and equality before rule of law. From a
liberal standpoint such norms and institutions are ends in themselves and not simply means
to achieve political competition (Coppedge et al. 2017d: 21, Lindberg et al. 2014).
Autocracies are regimes where rulers are not accountable to citizens in periodic elections.
They may hold elections and indeed most autocracies have introduced some form of elections
in recent decades. Yet, authoritarian rulers use various formal and informal instruments to
tilt the electoral playing field in their favor and evade electoral accountability (Diamond,
2002; Schedler, 2002; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Such tools
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include? blatant?manipulation? on? election? day? (from? ballot? box? stu ng? to? the? fabrication?
of?voting? results)?but?also?more? evasive?activities? such?as? restriction?of?media? freedom?and?
opposition? activities? (Schedler? 2002).? Hence,? there? is? an? emerging? consensus? to? di↵eren-
tiate? between? political? regimes? based? on? the? degree? of? competitiveness? of? their? elections.6?
Electoral?autocracies? hold?multiparty?elections? for?the?chief?executive,?but?they? fall?short?of?
democratic? standards?due? to? significant? irregularities,? limitations? on?party? competition,? or?
other?violations?of?Dahl’s? institutional?requisites.? This?definition?builds?on?Schedler’s? influ-
ential?work?on? electoral?authoritarianism? (2002;? 2006;? 2013)?and? the?notion?of? competitive?
authoritarianism?developed?by?(Levitsky?and?Way,?2010).
In?closed?autocracies, the chief executive is either not subjected to elections, or there is no ?
de-facto?competition? in?elections?such?as? in?one-party?regimes.? Regimes?with?elections?only?
for?the?legislature?(even?if?somewhat?competitive)?also?fall?into?this?category?(Schedler,?2013;?
Donno,? 2013;? Roessler? and? Howard,? 2009?? ???;? Brownlee,? 2009?? ???).? Some? scholars? (e.g.?
Gandhi?and?Lust-Okar?(2009))?categorize?countries?with?elections?only?for?the?legislature?(e.g.?
Jordan)?or?countries?with?elections?under?single-party?rule?(e.g.?North?Korea)?as?“Hegemonic?
Au-tocracies”.?However,?from?our?perspective?the?key?di↵erence?in?the?authoritarian?spectrum?
is?whether? the? o ce? of? the? chief? executive? is? subject? to? direct? or? indirect?multiparty? elec-
tions.? Therefore,?we?place? countries?without?multiparty? elections? for? the? chief? executive? in?
the?category?of?closed?autocracies.
2.1? Operationalization?with?V-Dem?Data
We?operationalize?our?regime?typology?using?new?data?from?the?Varieties?of?Democracy?(V-
Dem)?project.?Released? in?May?2017,?Version?7.0?covers?177?countries?from?1900?to?the?end?
of? 2016.? Approximately? half? of? the? indicators? in? the?V-Dem? dataset? are? based? on? factual?
information?from?o cial?documents?such?as?constitutions.?The?remainder?consists?of?expert?
assessments?on?topics?like?the?quality?of?elections?and?de-facto?compliance?with?constitutional?
standards.? On? such? issues,? typically?five? experts?provide? ratings? for? the? country,? thematic?
area? and? time? period? for?which? they? are? specialists.? To? address? coder? error? and? issues? of?
comparability?across?countries?and?over?time,?V-Dem?has?developed?a?Bayesian?measurement?
model?(Marquardt?and?Pemstein,?2017;?Pemstein?et?al.,?2017).
6There are also other approaches of characterizing autocracies, which do not emphasis the role of elections,
but distinguish autocracies based on other features such as the characteristics of the ruling coalition, e.g.
military, personalist, or civilian. (e.g. Geddes et al. 2014), sources of legitimation (Kailitz, 2013).
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We use several V-Dem indicators and indices for our regime typology.7 To draw the
line between democracy and autocracy, we rely on the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index
(EDI, v2x polyarchy), which aims to capture Dahl’s notion of the institutional requisites
for polyarchy and the V-Dem indicators for multi-party (v2elmulpar osp) and free and fair
(v2elfrefair osp) elections.8 The EDI measures not only the extent to which regimes hold
clean, free and fair elections, but also the existence of freedom of expression, alternative
sources of information, and association (including no barriers for political parties), as well
as universal su↵rage and the degree to which government policy is vested in elected political
o cials. The index runs from 0 (not democratic) to 1 (fully democratic) and is based on
separate indices for each of those institutions, which in turn are aggregated from 41 indica-
tors (Coppedge et al. 2016; Coppedge et al. 2017a).9
To qualify as a democracy, regimes have to fulfill at least a minimal level of the prereq-
uisites of the electoral democracy as captured by the EDI. Based on Lindberg (2016: 90)
we draw the line at a score of above 0.5 on the EDI and introduce two additional neces-
sary conditions: (1) de-facto multiparty elections as indicated by a score above 2 on the
V-Dem indicator for multiparty elections (v2elmulpar osp; 10 and (2) elections have to be
free and fair in sense of allowing at least for substantial competition and freedom of partic-
ipation as indicated by a score above 2 on the V-Dem indicator for free and fair elections
7This regime typology can be found in the V-Dem Data Set V7 under the variable name “e v2x regime”
(Coppedge et al. 2017a, 2017b).
8The V-Dem measurement model converts rater scores to interval-level point estimates (Pemstein et al.,
2017). We use a version of the data in which these interval-level estimates were converted to original 0-4
scale, which is indicated by the su x osp.
9The aggregation rule for the EDI incorporates both “compensation” where one strong sub-component
can partially compensate for lack of electoral democracy in others, and “punishment” for countries weak
in one sub-component according to the “weakest link” argument. Thus, the index is formed in one half by
the weighted average of its component indices and in the other half by the multiplication of those indices
(Coppedge et al. 2016; 2017a).
10V-Dem asked coders to assess: “Was this election multiparty?” Response options were: “0: No. No-
party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are
legal but they are all de-facto controlled by the dominant party). 1: Not really. No-party or single-party
(defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats
or the presidency. 2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition
is highly constrained legally or informally. 3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either
one main opposition party is prevented (de-jure or de-facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil
unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory. 4: Yes. Elections are
multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist
parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).” (Coppedge et al. 2017a: 81).
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(v2elfrfair osp).1112 These two additional necessary criteria ensure that the electoral core of
democracy is at least minimally achieved in all regimes classified as democracies. Compared
to merely taking a cut-o↵ point on the EDI, our choice of adding two additional criteria also
helps to mitigate concerns that moving from continuous scales to categorical measures is a
somewhat arbitrary decision (see for example Bogaards (2010)). We consciously decided not
to take additional criteria from Dahl’s list of prerequisites as necessary criteria in order to
allow for weaknesses in one area to be balanced by strengths in another area.
We operationalize liberal democracies by the same criteria as electoral democracies, but
they must additionally satisfy the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of
law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive, as indicated by a score
above 0.8 on the V-Dem Liberal Component Index (v2x liberal).13 Electoral autocracies fail
to meet one or more of the above-mentioned criteria of electoral democracies, but subject the
chief executive to elections at least a minimal level of multiparty competition as indicated
by a score above 1 on the V-Dem multiparty elections indicator (v2elmulpar osp). 14 Closed
autocracies do not satisfy the latter criterion.
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of regime types in the world in 2016. The good
news is that most regimes are in the democratic spectrum (56%): 45 countries qualify as
11V-Dem country expert coders were asked to assess: “Taking all aspects of the pre-election period,
election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free
and fair?” Response options are: “0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the o cial
results had little if anything to do with the ’will of the people’ (i.e., who became president; or who won the
legislative majority). 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the
end a↵ected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 2:
Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant
irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities a↵ected the outcome or not (as defined
above). 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did
not in the end a↵ect the outcome (as defined above). 4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and
logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.” (Coppedge
et al. 2017a: 96).
12These coding rules follow Lindbergs (2016: 90) scheme of coding a four-categorical version of the EDI
(e v2x polyarchy 4C).
13This index gives the average of following indices on a scale from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 1 (satisfied):
equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x jucon),
and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg legcon) (Coppedge et al. 2017a: 47).
14The V-Dem indicator v2ex hosw identifies if the Head of State (HoS) (v2ex hosw=1) or Head of Govern-
ment (HoG) (v2ex hosw<1) is the chief executive. If the HoG is the chief executive, the indicator v2expathhg
indicates whether the HoG is directly (8) or indirectly (7) elected or appointed by the HoS (6). In the first
case, we take the multiparty indicator for executive elections (v2elmulpar osp ex), in the second case for
legislative elections (v2elmulpar osp leg) and in the third case the score for HoS as follows. If the HoS is the
chief executive, the indicator v2expathhs indicates whether the HoS is directly (7) or indirectly (6) elected.
In the first case, we take the multiparty indicator for executive elections (v2elmulpar osp ex), in the second
case for legislative elections (v2elmulpar osp leg)
10
electoral democracies and 52 as liberal democracies (of 174 countries). 56 countries (32%)
are electoral autocracies and 21 (12%) are closed autocracies. For a complete list see Table
3 in the Appendix.
Figure 1: Regimes In the World (RIW) 2016
Source: V-Dem Data Set (Version 7; Coppedge et al. (2017c), variable e v2x regime).
2.2 Estimating Uncertainty: Confidence Intervals
A principal objection leveraged against degree/quantitative approaches to measuring regime
types, is the specter of misclassification of countries close to thresholds between categories,
and resulting misidentification of democratic transitions or breakdowns once they cross the
threshold (e.g. Boix et al. (2012)). However, qualitative approaches are not free from similar
problems, because they are based on the assessments of   often individual   coders, who
have their own thresholds of judging in which bin a particular regime belongs. The trend in
recent years where countries more often experience gradual backsliding rather than sudden
breakdown, and incremental democratization rather than a complete transition, makes this
concern more acute than ever before. The comparative advantage of quantitative approaches
is that at least the thresholds are known and the consequences of moving a threshold can be
tested (Lindberg 2016: 81).
The uncertainty estimates provided for each indicator and index in the V-Dem dataset,
provides a new and unique opportunity. These allow us to provide a non-arbitrary des-
ignation of cases with an ambiguous classification by statistical standards. Therefore, we
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present here a second version of the RIW typology (RIWci) taking this uncertainty into
account. 15 The V-Dem data set provides upper and lower bound estimates, which represent
a range of probable values for a given observation. 16 These confidence intervals increase
with uncertainty of the underlying data calculated by the Bayesian IRT model. Hence, we
use these confidence intervals to identify countries belonging to the upper or lower bound of
a regime category. If the point estimates of the indicators we use to classify countries into
regime types places country X in say, the electoral democracy category, but the upper or
lower bounds of the same indicators overlap the threshold to an adjacent category, we place
it in the upper or lower bound of the regime category.
For example, Macedonia’s score on the EDI was 0.53 in 2016, slightly above the thresh-
old for electoral democracy (0.5) and the values on multiparty (3.9) and free and fair (3.0)
elections clearly fulfill the criteria of electoral democracy. However, the lower bound of the
EDI score (v2x polyarchy codelow) for Macedonia is 0.48 and thus falls in the range for
electoral autocracy. In the RIWci measure, we label the country as “Electoral Democracy
Lower Bound” reflecting this uncertainty associated with the classification. Substantively,
it makes sense, because there are credible reports that freedom of expression has been re-
stricted in Macedonia in recent years.17 Similarly, Poland lost its status as liberal democracy
in 2016, because the Liberal Component Index (v2x liberal) dropped with 0.798 slightly
below the threshold of 0.8. However, the upper bound of the Liberal Component Index
(v2x liberal codehigh) remains with 0.858 above the threshold. Therefore, we categorize the
country as “Electoral Democracy Upper Bound”.
In addition to o↵ering a more nuanced ordinal measure of regime types, this provides
the first real opportunity to calculate and analyze how the world has changed over time
with regards to shares of countries in grey zones between regime types. Figure 2 shows
that almost all countries were unambiguously in one regime category or the other at the
15This regime typology can be found in the V-Dem Data Set V7 under the variable name “e v2x regime ci”
(Coppedge et al. 2017c). We are grateful to Valeriya Mechkova for the idea of estimating uncertainty in a
regime typology.
16These estimates are based on the interval in which the V-Dem measurement model places 68 percent
of the probability mass for each country-year score (Pemstein et al., 2017). For the aggregated indices, such
as the EDI, the confidence bands are based on one standard deviation from the mean point estimate. They
reflect country-year variance in the underlying mid-level indices (BFAs), which reflects the variance in the
estimates of their component indicators. Both estimation procedures, for the aggregated indices and the
indicators, largely reflect the level of coder disagreement.
17On the recent developments in Macedonia see BBC (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
36031417) and the European Digital Rights association (https://edri.org/huge-protest-against-corruption-
surveillance-in-macedonia/).
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beginning of the last century (black line). The level of ambiguity started increasing from
around 1960 and has become worse during the third wave of democratization. By 2016,
almost 30 percent of all countries are in one of the ambiguous categories while 12 percent fall
in the critical grey zone between democracy and autocracy. Two interrelated developments
seem to drive this trend in the data: More and more countries move in the grey zone between
regime categories because they have dejure democratic institutions, but in reality undermine
their e↵ectiveness. Therefore, first, the point estimates for the relevant indicators move
closer to the thresholds for the regime categories and, second, the confidence intervals of
the underlying V-Dem indicators increase in recent decades, indicating greater uncertainty
about the actual conditions from year to year.
Figure 2: The Development of Ambiguity in RIW Regime Categorization from 1900 to Today
Note: Unambiguous regimes clearly meet the criteria of a specific regime category. Ambiguous regimes are
placed in one of the intermediary categories due to scoring close to the threshold or coder disagreement.
Source: V-Dem Data Set V7 (variable e v2x regime ci).
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Figure 3 shows the development over time of the RIWci regime types (tinted colors indi-
cate ambiguous cases). The most striking development is the sharp decline of closed autocra-
cies particularly since the 1980’s, in favor for electoral autocracies and electoral democracies.
Equally striking is that the number of regimes with ambiguous status increased in recent
decades (tinted colors). The three waves of democratization (Huntington, 1992) protrude
clearly with a first wave lasting until 1922, a second wave starting at the end of World War
II, and the third sparked o↵ by the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, peaking in
the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Figure 3: Regimes in the World (RIW) 1900-2016
Note: Source: V-Dem Data Set (Version 7; Coppedge et al. (2017c), variable e v2x regime ci)
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3 Exploring the Threshold: Comparing RIW to Di-
chotomous Measures of Democracy
The distinction between democracy and autocracy is arguably the most important aspect of
a regime typology. The RIW measure lends itself also to needs for a dichotomous measure
by collapsing the two categories of democracy, and then two autocratic types, respectively.
In this section, we compare our distinction between democracy and autocracy to the most
relevant extant measures, namely those provided by Boix, Miller and Rosato (BMR; 2012);
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (CGV; 2010); Geddes, Wright and Franz (GWF; 2014); and
Freedom House (FH 2017), Polity (Marshall et al. 2016) and Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius
(WTH; 2013). The most striking di↵erence is that the coverage of our data set is much vaster
than that of any other extant measure with the notable exception of BMR and Polity. We
go back to 1900 and plan yearly updates whereas other datasets typically start their coding
after World War II and have no observations in the current decade.
Table 2 compares the RIW measure to the other key measures used in the literature.
The third column shows that the rate of agreement is relatively high, varying between 88.5
percent (CGV) and 93.1 percent (WTH). Excluding cases that our typology qualifies as am-
biguous, the level of agreement varies between 91.7 percent (CGV) and 93.5 percent (GWF).
When there is disagreement between RIW and other measures, our classification tends to
be more conservative and set a higher bar for what counts as a democracy, i.e. classifying
countries as autocracies that others place in the democratic regime spectrum.
Figure 4, 5, 6 and 7 show how our measures compare over time (restricted to overlapping
country years only to make them comparable). The bulk of our disagreements are pre 1970s
and concern early periods of post-colonial states, which may have introduced elections, yet
fall far short of de-facto establishing the institutional features necessary for a meaningful
democratic process. Subsequently, we discuss our disagreement with each measure in more
detail.
The RIW measure has second largest number of overlapping country-year observations
with BMR (11, 262 cases) and agree on the classification in 90.8 percent of these observa-
tions. The level of agreement increases to 93.5 percent if we exclude observations that fall
into the RIWci ambiguous categories. The disagreement between the two measures is mainly
due to BMR classifying countries as democracies that are coded as autocracies in RIW (84
percent of all disagreements), i.e. in general BMR have a lower threshold for democracy. Due
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Table 2: Comparison with six dichotomous measures to RIW
Country Coverage Country-Year Agree with RIW Autocracy RIW Democracy
Years Overlap with RIW RIW Other Democracy Other Autocracy
RIW 17140 1900-
2016
BMR 16988 1800- 11,262 90.8% 7.7% 1.5%
2010 (93.5%) (5.8%) (0.7%)
Polity 16826 1800- 11,394 92.1% 5.4% 2.5%
2015 (94.3%) (4.1%) (1.6%)
CGV 9117 1946- 8,187 88.5% 8.5% 2.9%
2008 (91.7%) (6.4%) (1.9%)
GWF 7956 1946- 7,688 90.2% 7.4% 2.4%
2010 (92.8%) (5.7%) (1.4%)
WTH 6279 1970- 6,277 93.1% 2.8% 4.0%
2010 (96.8%) (1.3%) (1.9%)
FH 6277 1973- 6,275 88.8% 1.7% 9.6%
2014 (93.3%) (0.9%) (4.6%)
Note: Numbers in brackets are calculated excluding ambiguous cases (see part 2).
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Figure 4: Comparing Regimes 1900 to 2007 - RIW and BMR
Note: The graph only compares observations that are covered in both data sets hence is limited to
1900-2007
to their neglect for female su↵rage, BMR code Chile between 1909 and 1949 as democratic
even though only 25 to 35 percent of the adult population enjoyed the right to vote. Fur-
thermore, while BMR (and CGV) code Guatemala as democratic after the general election
in 1958 up until the civil war onset in 1981, RIW captures the absence of de-facto minimum
level of institutional requirements of democracy during this period and classify it as an elec-
toral autocracy. We think the RIW classification has greater face validity. Illiterate women
were banned from voting up until 1966 (OAS 2008), and according to V-Dem data, parties
faced severe obstacles to both form and participate in elections. Electoral intimidation was
common throughout the period, and civil society organizations were not free to form and
operate. Another set of examples that can be mentioned is that the BMR codes Czechoslo-
vakia (1939-1945), Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands (1940-1945), and Denmark (1943-44),
as democratic during the years of German occupation whereas RIW does not (see Figure 4).
Out of the few BMR autocracies that are coded as RIW democracies half concern our am-
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biguous categories (RIWci). For the other half, however we are confident in categorization,
and countries like; Ecuador (2000-2002); Fiji (1993-2005); and Senegal (1993-99) had indeed
a set of minimum democratic requirements in place.
Polity IV is the data source with the greatest number of country-years overlapping with
RIW (11, 394). Following Marshall et al. (2014) suggestion to treat countries above and
equal to 6 on the their combined Polity2 scale as democracies, we get a dichotomous measure
of democracy that agree with RIW in 92.1 percent of all country-years that overlap (94.3
percent excluding ambiguous cases). Most disagreements are again due to RIW autocracies
coded by Polity as democracies. For example, Polity codes Burundi (2005-2013), Malawi
(1994-2013) and Malaysia (2008-2012) as a democracies while V-Dem coders observe severe
obstacles to democracy resulting in the country years being coded as RIW autocracies. There
also disagreement of the other sort, for example, while Polity code Suriname just short of
being a democracy (score 5) since 1991, V-Dem’s indicators rate the country as a liberal
democracy for the same time period. Figure 5 shows the share of countries coded as RIW
democracies for each value on the combined Polity scale. In general, higher values on the
Polity scale corresponds to a higher share of RIW democracies. The spike at the polity
score of 0 is the result of few observations at particular score and is driven by Burkina Faso
(2001-2013) and Uruguay (1939-1951), which are RIW democracies. According to V-Dem
coders Burkina Faso had relatively strong democratic institutions, both de-jure and de-facto
during these years. While Uruguay did not guarantee full political freedoms in the first three
years following the dictatorship of Gabriel Terra (1933-1938), Uruguay can indeed be con-
sidered a full-fledged liberal democracy after the introduction of the new constitution in 1942.
All observations in the WTH data set are covered in RIW with the exception of Mozam-
bique 1975-77. Out of all measure compared in this paper, WTH’s has the highest level
of concordance with the RIW agreeing on 93.1 percent of all observations (Figure 6; 96.8
percent excluding ambiguous cases). WTH is based on the Freedom House (FH) and Polity
ratings (see discussion in Part 1). When defining only countries that FH codes “free” as
democracies FH and RIW agree on the coding of 88.8 percent of all observations, and 93.3
percent when excluding the RIWci ambiguous cases. The bulk of disagreements stems from
countries that we classify as democracies but that are “Partly free” according to Freedom
House. However, lowering the dichotomous threshold to include all “Partly free” countries as
democracies reduce the concordance between the measures to 75.5 percent, indicating that
a majority of countries that FH code as partly free are coded as autocracies in RIW. Hence,
overall the agreement between RIW and the WTH datasets is greater than when comparing
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Figure 5: Share of RIW Democracies for each Polity value
Note: The dotted vertical lines mark Polity’s suggested thresholds of autocracy (<= -6) and democ-
racy (>= 6), with anocracy in between. Cases of foreign interruption, interregnum or anarchy
and transitions (polity codes: -66, -77, and -88), are excluded from this comparison
RIW to FH and Polity separately.
CGV provides regime classifications for 9,117 country-years and there are 8,187 obser-
vations that overlap with RIW. The classification of observations into democracies and au-
tocracies agree in 88.5 percent of all overlapping country years.18 Out of the 933 cases that
we disagree on, most (696) are cases where CGV code a country as democratic and RIW as
autocratic. These disagreements are due to that CGV has a lower threshold for democracy
than RIW. For instance, for the most recent years CGV classify Bhutan (2007-08); Kyrgyzs-
tan (2005-2008); and Armenia (1995-2008) as democracies whereas the V-Dem expert-based
de-facto measures indicate severe shortcomings even in terms of the most basic requirements
18CGV cover 973 observations that are not in the RIW measure. These are mainly micro states not
included in the V-Dem Data Set: Luxemburg; Andorra; Antigua & Barbuda; Bahamas; Bahrain; Belize;
Brunei; Grenada; Kiribati; Lichtenstein; Malta; Marshall Island; Micronesia; Nauru; Palau; Samoa; San
Marino; St. Kitts & Nevis; St Lucia; St. Vincent & the Grenadines; Tonga; Tuvalu; United Arab Emirates.
Additionally, CGW covers Oman 1970-1999; Cameroon 1961-1963; and Mozambique 1975-1977, which are
not included in V-Dem.
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Figure 6: Comparing Regimes 1946-2008 - RIW and WTH
Note: The figure only compares observations that are covered in both data sets hence is limited to
1970-2010.
of democracy. There are also some cases where RIW classifies countries as democracies that
CGV code as autocratic. This is due to their application of the controversial alternation
rule as a criterion for democracy. For example, Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia where
the ruling parties won several subsequent elections after the introduction of multiparty elec-
tions are autocracies according to CGV. While these countries have yet to experience an
alternation of power and incumbent advantage is strong, according to V-Dem’s indicators
of de-facto respect for the institutional requirements of democracy, there are for example no
major restrictions on opposition parties and elections are reasonably free and fair. Botswana
rates between 0.70 and 0.73 on the EDI during 2000 to 2010 while the corresponding figures
are 0.75 to 0.81 for South Africa and 0.63 to 0.67 for Namibia. We think these examples
show that the RIW has greater face validity than the CGV.
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The RIW measure covers all but 168 of GWF’s 7,956 observations19, and out of the
overlapping country years the agreement of the two measures are at 90.2 percent (92.8
percent excluding ambiguous cases). Our measures deviate in particular before 1970s and
again in the early 2000s. This divergence is largely driven by that RIW is more conservative
with labeling a country as democratic than is GWF (Figure 7). For example, GWF code the
following countries as democracies: Sierra Leone (1999- 2002); The Central African Republic
(1993-2003); Burundi (2005-2010) and Nepal (1991-2002) where V-Dem coders observe severe
violations or complete absence of institutional prerequisites for democracy. In contrast, a
number of countries in which V-Dem coders observe relatively strong democratic institutions,
both de-jure and de-facto, are coded as autocracies by GWF such as: Botswana (1967-
2010); Burkina Faso (1993-2010); Ghana (1996-2000); Namibia (1991-2010); and Senegal
(1983-2000).
Figure 7: Comparing Regimes 1946 to 2008 - RIW, CGV and GWF
Note: The graph only compares observations that are available in all three data sets hence is
limited to 1946-2008.
19These are the two small states Luxemburg and UAE, Oman 46-99, Cameroon 61-63, and Mozambique
76-77, which are not included in the V-Dem Data
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3.1 Taking a Stand: How RIW Di↵ers from Other Measures
Overall our RIW measure tracks extant major binary measures of democracy closely, but
there are substantial di↵erences mainly concerning cases where de-facto practices deviate
from de-jure standards. Other datasets tend to code such cases more frequently as democ-
racies than we do. For example, all other measures code Kenya as democratic20 in the
years following the crisis that erupted after president Kibaki was accused of stealing the De-
cember 2007 election (Rutten and Owuor, 2009), in which politically motivated (Kagwanja
and Southall, 2009), and allegedly state sponsored violence (HRW, 2008), left more than
1300 people dead and 600 000 people displaced. The RIW measure picks up this dramatic
change and codes Kenya as autocratic up until the more free and fair general elections of
2013. Furthermore, while CGV, GWF and BMR code Sri Lanka as democratic between 2005
and 2009, RWI captures the limitations to democracy that existed before and during the
2008/09 Civil War. Similarly, CGV, GWF, BMR and Polity code Burundi as democratic
following the presidential election of 2005, while RIW codes Burundi as autocratic reflecting
that there was no de-facto multiparty competition as president Nkurunziza ran unopposed.
Again CGV, GWF, BMR and Polity are lenient on the democracy threshold and code Central
African Republic as democratic from 1993 to 2002 when minimal institutional requirements
for democracy seems to have been far from established as the V-Dem data indicates. RIW
categorizes Nigeria prior to 2011 as electoral autocracy reflecting the widespread electoral
manipulation that marred all Nigerian elections until 2011 (Lewis, 2011), while CGV and
GWF classify Nigeria as a democracy from 2000.
Another set of divergent observations - but much fewer - are classified as democracies in
RIW, but most or all other measures code them as autocratic. This applies for example to
Namibia (1994-2010) where free and fair multiparty elections in combination with freedom
of expression and association qualifies Namibia as a democracy based on the assessment of
the V-Dem coders, but the other data sets di↵er. Similar disagreement can be observed for
Zambia (1994-2007), Burkina Faso (1993-2010) and Mexico (1995-99).
Conclusion
To address many research questions scholars need to sort political regimes into categories.
Extant approaches to this task are laudable, but limited in their temporal or geographical
coverage and often not transparent in their coding procedure, which might bias results. In
20Except for FH that classify Kenya as “Partly free” since 2002
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this paper we propose a new regime typology Regimes in the World (RIW) covering almost
all countries from 1900 to 2016. We classify countries only as democratic if minimal insti-
tutional requisites are fulfilled in terms of freedom of expression and association, universal
su↵rage, alternative sources of information and the degree to which power is vested in elected
o cials. Furthermore, we distinguish between democratic (liberal and electoral democracy)
and autocratic subtypes (closed and electoral autocracy).
Our threshold for democracy is more demanding than in most extant data sets, because
we base our typology not only the existence and quality of elections, but on Dahl’s notion
of Polyarchy. Some extant data sets are limited to de-jure rules and other indicators that
are directly observable. For instance, the widely used CGV data applies the controversial
alternation rule, which qualifies countries as non-democratic simply because they have not
experienced a turnover in power. Other data sets only focus on the implementation of
elections in a narrow sense, such as their de-jure competitiveness. Assessing the quality of
elections has become more and more di cult over time and involves a great deal of judgment
on the side of the coders, which increases demand for transparent and replicable coding pro-
cedures. RIW is based on V-Dem’s high standards in the aggregation of expert-coded data
and recruitment of expert coders, which make the data more reliable and allows us to assess
the de-facto implementation of institutions and not only their de-jure existence.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that even based on V-Dem data - classifying political
regimes remains a challenging task and that some cases simply do not fit neatly in any one
category. This is one reason why we include an estimate of uncertainty reflecting inter-
coder disagreement and how close countries are to the thresholds of the regime categories.
In future work we plan to operationalize additional non-democratic regime types based on
V-Dem data for instance hegemonic electoral autocracies and countries without a stable
political regime.
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A Appendix A
Table 3: Regimes In the World 2016 - Country List
Liberal Democracy CI Electoral Democracy CI Electoral Autocracy CI Closed Autocracy CI
Albania Colombia + Comoros + Kuwait +
Australia Ghana + Fiji + Turkmenistan +
Austria Guyana + Guinea + Vietnam +
Belgium Croatia + Honduras +
Benin Israel + Haiti + China
Bulgaria Sri Lanka + Iraq + Cuba
Barbados Moldova + Madagascar + Eritrea
Canada Nepal + Mozambique + Jordan
Switzerland Panama + Niger + Laos
Chile Peru + Papua New Guinea + Libya
Cape Verde Poland + Somaliland + Morocco
Costa Rica Senegal + Serbia + Oman
Cyprus Suriname + North Korea
Czech Republic Seychelles + Afghanistan Palestine/Gaza
Germany Angola Qatar
Denmark Burkina Faso Armenia Saudi Arabia
Spain Bolivia Azerbaijan Somalia
Estonia Brazil Burundi South Sudan
Finland Ivory Coast Bangladesh Swaziland
France Dominican Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina Syria
United Kingdom Ecuador Belarus Thailand
Greece Georgia Cameroon Yemen
Ireland Guatemala Congo, DRC
Iceland Indonesia Congo, Republic of
Italy India Djibouti
Japan Liberia Algeria
South Korea Lesotho Egypt
Lithuania Mexico Ethiopia
Latvia Mali Gabon
Netherlands Mongolia Gambia
Norway Nigeria Equatorial Guinea
New Zealand Philippines Iran
Portugal Paraguay Kazakhstan
Slovakia Solomon Islands Cambodia
Slovenia El Salvador Maldives
Sweden Togo Burma/Myanmar
Tunisia Timor-Leste Montenegro
Uruguay Mauritania
United States Central African Republic - Malaysia
Guinea-Bissau - Nicaragua
Argentina - Kenya - Pakistan
Bhutan - Kosovo - Palestine/West Bank
Botswana - Kyrgyzstan - Russia
Hungary - Lebanon - Rwanda
Jamaica - Macedonia - Sudan
Mauritius - Malawi - Singapore
Namibia - Sierra Leone - Chad
Romania - Tajikistan
Sa˜o Tome´ & Pr`ıncipe - Turkey
Trinidad & Tobago - Tanzania
Taiwan - Uganda
Vanuatu - Ukraine
South Africa - Venezuela
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Zanzibar
Uzbekistan -
Note: Regime category by country for 2016 taking into account confidence intervals estimations. A + denotes that the
country is in the upper bound of its category while a - indicates that the country is in the lower bound. For more detail please
see page 11. Source: V-Dem Data Set (Version 7; Coppedge et al. (2017c), variable e v2x regime ci).
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